Publishing transactional data about individuals in an anonymous form is increasingly required by organizations. Recent approaches ensure that potentially identifying information cannot be used to link published transactions to individuals' identities. However, these approaches are inadequate to anonymize data that is both protected and practically useful in applications because they incorporate coarse privacy requirements, do not integrate utility requirements, and tend to explore a small portion of the solution space. In this paper, we propose the first approach for anonymizing transactional data under application-specific privacy and utility requirements. We model such requirements as constraints, investigate how these constraints can be specified, and propose COnstraint-based Anonymization of Transactions, an algorithm that anonymizes transactions using a flexible anonymization scheme to meet the specified constraints. Experiments with benchmark datasets verify that COAT significantly outperforms the current state-of-the-art algorithm in terms of data utility, while being comparable in terms of efficiency. Our approach is also shown to be effective in preserving both privacy and utility in a real-world scenario that requires disseminating patients' information.
Introduction
Contextual information [1] dictates how data should be interpreted in specific applications and can be exploited to improve the prediction and accuracy of data mining [9, 57] . In this work, we consider contextual information in the form of requirements related to the privacy and utility of published transactional data (i.e., data in which a set of items correspond to an individual). We model these requirements using constraints and study how they can be used to ensure that published data conceals the identity of individuals, while preserving utility in intended applications.
Published transactional data can disclose the identity of the corresponding individual, even after removing identifying information, when an attacker knows some of the items an individual is associated with [36, 45, 72] . Imagine for example that Alice was diagnosed with the diseases contained in the first transaction of Fig. 1a and told her neighbor Bob that she suffers from a, b and c, which are relatively common. Publishing the data of Fig. 1a after removing patients' names allows Bob to find out that the first transaction corresponds to Alice, since there is only one transaction containing a, b and c in this dataset. This problem, referred to as identity disclosure, must be addressed to comply with various regulations (e.g., [50] ) and to protect individuals' privacy. Having identified Alice's transaction, for example, Bob can infer that Alice also suffers from the diseases d, e, f, g and h.
Motivation
To prevent identity disclosure, the portions of transactions that are potentially linkable to identifying information need to be explicitly specified and protected prior to release of the data. Many methods achieve this by formulating a set of privacy constraints, which are satisfied by transforming data so that each individual is linked to a sufficiently large number of transactions with respect to the constraints. This process preserves privacy because an attacker must distinguish an individual's real transaction among the transformed ones to identify him or her. However, data transformation may harm data utility when specific utility requirements are unaccounted for. Thus, we observe that it is essential to balance privacy constraints with utility constraints to ensure meaningful analysis in the context of applications anonymized data is intended for. To show the importance of both types of constraints consider Example 1.
Example 1 Imagine that a hospital needs to publish the dataset of Fig. 1a , where each transaction corresponds to a patient (patients' names are not released) and consists of a set of diagnosis codes. Certain combinations of diagnosis codes, such as abc and defgh of Fig. 1b , are regarded as potentially linkable and must be associated with at least 5 transactions to prevent identity disclosure. At the same time, the published data must support studies in which the number of patients diagnosed with cold, denoted with c, must be accurately determined. These requirements can be modeled via the privacy constraints in Fig. 1b and a utility constraint {c}. Figure 2c illustrates an anonymization that satisfies these constraints. In this anonymization, the codes a and b have been replaced by (a, b), which means that a patient is diagnosed with a or b or a and b, and the codes g and h by (g, h), which is interpreted similarly to (a, b) . Observe that each patient can be linked to no less than 5 transactions using the combinations abc or defgh, while the number of patients suffering from cold can still be accurately computed.
Limitations of existing methodologies
Preventing identity disclosure in transactional data has recently been investigated [28, 63, 72] ; however, existing approaches inadequately address application requirements, such as that of Example 1, because they do not fully take into account privacy and utility requirements while anonymizing data. First, they do not support detailed privacy requirements, implicitly assuming that all combinations of items (itemsets) that contain a certain number of items need to be protected. In many applications, however, potentially linkable itemsets involve certain items only and vary in size. In these cases, existing approaches will significantly distort data as a result of unnecessarily protecting itemsets, whose number rapidly increases with their size. For instance, in the presence of the privacy constraints in Example 1, the approaches of [63] and [72] would protect all 56 combinations of 5 diagnosis codes (e.g., abcde, bcde f , etc.).
Second, prior approaches attempt to minimize the distortion of data, but completely neglect specific utility requirements. Thus, they do not guarantee generating practically useful solutions for environments where usability is based on well-defined policies, such as in epidemiology (where combinations of diagnosis codes form syndromes) [41] . For instance, when applied to the dataset of Fig. 1a , [63] and [72] produce the anonymizations of Fig. 2a and b (respectively). These anonymizations do not support the study of Example 1 because they do not allow the number of patients suffering from cold to be accurately computed, as a result of violating the utility constraint {c}.
In addition, existing approaches employ non-flexible anonymization models to meet privacy constraints. Specifically, the approaches of [28, 63] require a group of items to be generalized to their closest common ascendant according to a hierarchy, while that of [72] only suppresses items before data release. For example, [63] protects a, b and c by generalizing them to their closest common ascendant (a, b, c) according to the hierarchy of Fig. 3 , while [72] does so by eliminating them from the released dataset. Consequently, these approaches fail to generate anonymizations which are practically useful, but inconsistent with the employed anonymization models.
Contributions
This paper proposes the first approach that exploits application-specific privacy and utility requirements while anonymizing transactional data. Given a dataset and a set of constraints, our approach prevents identity disclosure by ensuring that each transaction is indistinguishable from at least k − 1 other transactions with respect to privacy constraints, while satisfying utility constraints. For instance, when applied to anonymize the data in Fig. 1a using the constraints in Fig. 1b and c, our approach generates the anonymization of Fig. 2c , which satisfies the imposed constraints.
Our work makes the following specific contributions
First, we propose a novel constraint specification model that enables data owners to express detailed privacy and utility requirements. We introduce privacy constraints that allow protecting the required itemsets only, thereby reducing data distortion, and utility constraints that ensure the utility of anonymized data in practice. Acknowledging that constraint specification may be difficult when specific domain knowledge is lacking, we also propose an algorithm to extract privacy constraints from the data and a recipe for specifying utility constraints.
Second, we introduce a flexible set-based anonymization model that allows the modeling of a large number of possible ways in which items can be generalized or suppressed. By exploiting this model, our approach can produce fine-grained anonymizations with substantially better utility than that of [63] and [72] . For example, to meet the privacy constraint p 1 (Fig. 1b) , our solution generalizes a and b to (a, b) and leaves c intact, retaining more information than [63] , which releases (a, b, c), and [72] , which eliminates a, b and c.
Third, we study the problem of anonymizing data while satisfying the specified constraints and minimizing data distortion. We show that this problem is NP-hard and develop a heuristic algorithm, called COnstraint-based Anonymization of Transactions (COAT), to solve it. COAT iteratively selects privacy constraints and transforms data to satisfy them. For each privacy constraint, it generalizes items in accordance with the specified utility constraints and attempts to minimize information loss. When a privacy constraint cannot be satisfied through generalization, COAT suppresses the least number of items required to meet this constraint.
Fourth, we investigate the effectiveness of our approach through experiments on widelyused benchmark datasets and a real application case study on patients' data extracted from the electronic medical record system [60] of the Vanderbilt University Medical Center, a large healthcare provider in the US Our results verify that the proposed methodology is able to anonymize transactions under various privacy and utility constraints with less information loss than the state-of-the-art method [63] and generate high-quality anonymizations in a real-world scenario in which published data must support certain biomedical studies.
Paper organization
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Related work is reviewed in Sect. 2. We formally define our constraint specification model and the problem of anonymizing transactions under constraints in Sect. 3. A study of this problem and our solution to it are presented in Sect. 4. Section 5 presents methods for specifying constraints. Sections 6 and 7 report experimental results and a case study of applying COAT respectively. Finally, we conclude the paper in Sect. 8.
Related work
The use of contextual information allows for a large number of data mining methods [8, 10, 11, 16, 59 ] to effectively discover and interpret meaningful knowledge and to be successfully applied to various domains [27, 69] . Privacy-preserving data mining methods exploit contextual information mainly in determining parts of data that require protection. In this section, we discuss some popular privacy-preserving methods, categorizing them into those that attempt to protect the privacy of individuals represented in the data and those that aim to prevent certain sensitive patterns from being mined from the data [4] .
Privacy-preserving data publishing
Transforming the data to prevent individuals' sensitive information from being leaked is a popular approach to protect privacy, which can be performed by various techniques, such as randomization [6, 30, 73] , rank swapping [43, 49] , and anonymization [32, 54, 62] . In this section, we discuss some representative anonymization methods, with an emphasis on their ability to exploit contextual information.
Preventing identity disclosure
A well-established anonymization principle is k-anonymity [54, 62] , which requires each record of a table to be indistinguishable from at least k − 1 other records with respect to a set of potentially linkable attributes. Satisfying the latter principle guarantees protection against identity disclosure, because it ensures that an individual is linked to no less than k records of a dataset with respect to potentially linkable attributes. Therefore, k-anonymity serves as the basis for many privacy-preserving approaches [32, 33, 54, 62, 71] that are applicable in settings including location-based services [22, 25, 47] and healthcare [15, 42] . Furthermore, there is an ongoing effort to develop effective k-anonymization algorithms that deal with various types of data, such as relational [31, 48] , sequential [52] , trajectory [26, 31] , and graph data [35] .
However, most anonymization methods [7, 29, 32, 33, 54, 62] adopt a fixed privacy requirement based on k-anonymity [54, 62] , which assumes that all information about an individual is potentially linkable, and do not control the amount of data transformation that is applied. As a result, they do not ensure that published data can be used effectively in applications. Acknowledging this issue, the work of [42] considers a more flexible privacy requirement, in which combinations of up to a certain number of potentially linkable attributes need to be protected, while [20, 37, 65] limit data transformation based on the amount of information loss, measured on the entire dataset [20] , or on certain attributes and values [37, 65] . Although we share the goal of generating protected and practically useful solutions in applications with these methods, we consider transactional data, which requires special treatment because it has different semantics [63, 72] .
Publishing transactions to prevent identity disclosure was recently investigated in [28, 63] . In [63] , k m -anonymity was proposed to prevent attackers with the knowledge of at most m items from linking an identified individual to less than k published transactions. The authors of [63] designed three algorithms to enforce k m -anonymity, but their Apriori algorithm is the only one that is sufficiently scalable for use in practice. It operates in a bottom-up fashion, beginning with itemsets comprised of one item and subsequently considers incrementally larger itemsets. In each iteration, k m -anonymity is enforced using a hierarchy-based generalization model. The primary differences between our work and the approach of [63] were discussed in the Introduction. He et al. [28] proposed anonymizing transactional data based on k-anonymity, which is enforced through a top-down, generalization-based algorithm. While this approach has been shown to be effective at minimizing data distortion, it can generate data that is difficult to use in practice. This is because, unlike our approach, it supports no other privacy requirement than k-anonymity and does not take utility requirements into account. Moreover, the approach of [28] can harm data utility in mining applications, as a result of allowing instances of the same item in different transactions to be generalized differently [19] . It is also worth noting that the algorithms developed by the authors of [63] and [28] cannot deal with the type of privacy and utility requirements we consider, even when they are extended to check whether these requirements are satisfied during anonymization. This is because these algorithms rely upon the theoretical properties of different privacy models than ours to process privacy constraints, while their item grouping strategies are not effective at constructing generalizations that satisfy detailed utility constraints.
Preventing sensitive information disclosure
Beyond identity disclosure is the threat of disclosing an individual's sensitive information in data publishing. In fact, k-anonymity may not prevent an attacker from inferring an individual's sensitive information. This can occur when a k-anonymous relational table contains a "large" number of records that have the same value over potentially linkable attributes as well as the same sensitive attribute value [38] . In response, many works proposed privacy principles that control the distribution of sensitive attribute values within a group [12, 34, 38, 68] and are typically enforced in addition to k-anonymity. The authors of [38] proposed l-diversity, a principle that requires each group to contain at least l "diverse" attribute values, while the approach of [34] attempts to ensure that the distribution of sensitive values in a group is the same as that in the whole table.
Methods for preventing the inference of sensitive items in transactional data have also been introduced [21, 48, 72] . Ghinita et al. [21] proposed releasing groups of transactions, each of which contains potentially linkable items in their original form, as well as a summary of the frequencies of sensitive items for the transactions in the group. The method of [21] limits the probability of associating a transaction to a sensitive item in a group, but, since public items are released intact, it provides no protection against identity disclosure. In [48] , the principle of multirelational k-anonymity, which enforces k-anonymity on multiple relational tables, was proposed. The latter principle can be used to guard against the inference of sensitive items in transactional data, but, unlike our approach, it adopts the fixed privacy requirement of k-anonymity and does not limit the amount of information loss incurred to anonymize data. Xu et al. [72] proposed (h, k, p)-coherence, a privacy principle that treats potentially linkable items similarly to k m -anonymity, and additionally limits the probability of inferring sensitive items. To satisfy (h, k, p)-coherence, [72] proposed an algorithm that discovers all unprotected itemsets of minimal size and protects them by iteratively suppressing the item contained in the greatest number of those itemsets.
Our approach focuses on guarding against identity disclosure, but it can be extended to additionally prevent the inference of sensitive items. This would involve specifying sensitive items among the non-potentially linkable ones [72] and limiting the probability of inferring combinations of sensitive items based on potentially linkable itemsets. The latter can be achieved by incorporating an additional check into our method following [64] . Specifically, we need to check the frequency of combinations of sensitive items that co-occur with potentially linkable itemsets and to further anonymize the latter, in accordance with the utility constraints, until the frequency of the combinations of sensitive items falls below a specified threshold. This extension, however, is beyond the scope of the current work.
Knowledge hiding
Another direction in privacy-preserving data mining is knowledge hiding, which aims to transform data in a way that prohibits the inference of sensitive knowledge patterns when data is mined after release. Methods based on knowledge hiding use contextual information that comes in various forms to allow data owners to specify sensitive patterns and to transform the original data in a way that conceals these patterns. A class of works focus on association rule hiding methods [66] , which consider association rules and attempt to protect them using heuristics [44, 51, 55, 61] or exact techniques [23, 24] . Oliveira et al. [51] , for example, propose a five-step heuristic algorithm that can hide association rules with only one scan of the data, while allowing a non-uniform level of privacy to be exercised for rules. Sensitive patterns in the form of classification rules have also been examined in [13, 14, 46] . The latter works protect classification rules using suppression-based [13, 14] or reconstruction-based techniques [46] . Furthermore, releasing frequent itemsets may lead to the inference of weakly supported itemsets through "inference channels", as shown in [17] . To block such channels, the authors of [17] proposed the suppression of itemsets supporting inference.
Another line of work examines how to mine data in a way that the resulting model will preserve privacy [56] . Friedman et al. [18] developed algorithms for building a decision tree classification model that satisfies k-anonymity. Finally, the use of contextual information has recently been considered in sequential pattern and spatiotemporal data mining. This led to the development of knowledge hiding methods that assume unconstrained [3] or networkconstrained user movement [2] . The latter methods capture contextual information using an underlying network (e.g., a road network) that specifies the allowable movement patterns of an individual and generate meaningful hiding solutions according to this network. Our work is fundamentally different from the aforementioned knowledge hiding approaches because we aim to publish data that prevent the disclosure of individuals' identities instead.
Background and problem formulation
In this section, we introduce the notations used in this paper and provide definitions for the set-based anonymization model, the concepts of privacy and utility constraints, and an information loss measure. Based on these definitions, we subsequently formulate our problem. 
Set-based anonymization
We propose a set-based anonymization model for transactional data, formally defined as follows:
Definition 1 (Set-Based Anonymization). A set-based anonymization of I is a setĨ = {ĩ 1 , . . . ,ĩM } with the property that each item in I is mapped to a unique itemĩ m ∈Ĩ, m ∈ [1,M] , that is a subset of I, using an anonymization function : I →Ĩ.
i is a generalized item when it contains at least one i r ∈ I that is mapped to a nonempty subset of I. We use the notationĩ = (i 1 , . . . , i m ) to refer to its elements (items) from I. A generalized itemĩ = (i 1 , . . . , i m ) is interpreted as any of the non-empty subsets of {i 1 , . . . , i m }. Also, when referring to a generalized itemĩ, the notation |ĩ| denotes the number of items ofĨ that are mapped toĩ. Any item from I that is mapped to the empty subset of I, denoted as ( ), is called suppressed, and is contained in the set S. Furthermore, since each item in I is mapped to a unique itemĩ m , we haveĩ r ∩ĩ s = ∅, for anyĩ r ,ĩ s ∈Ĩ, r = s, and The set-based anonymization model is flexible because mapping an item i r ∈ I to a generalized itemĩ does not force any other item i s ∈ I to be mapped toĩ. Thus, our model can be used to represent all possible mappings of items, effectively allowing a large portion of the space of possible anonymizations to be explored. This is important because it offers the potential for finding anonymizations with "low" information loss.
On the other hand, the generalization model adopted in [63] , forces all siblings of an original (leaf-level) item to be mapped to an intermediate node in the hierarchy when this item is generalized to the intermediate node. As a result, this model is restricted to represent a much smaller number of possible generalizations than our set-based anonymization model. Specifically, as explained in Corollary 1, the set-based anonymization model contains the generalization model used in [63] as a special case.
Corollary 1 The full-subtree recoding model is a special case of the set-based anonymization model, where eachĩ m , m ∈ [1,M], is mapped to an intermediate node of the considered hierarchy.
Our anonymization model transforms a dataset D into a new datasetD that helps prevent identity disclosure, since generalizing items results in an increase in the number of transactions ofD that can be associated with an individual. To understand why, assume that an item i r in D is mapped to the generalized itemĩ = (i r , i s ) after anonymizing D toD. Since sup(ĩ,D) is given by summing up sup(i r , D) and sup(i l , D) and subtracting sup(i r i s , D) , which is at most equal to any of these supports [5] , we have that sup(i r , D) is at most equal to sup(ĩ,D). Consider, for example, the items a, b and the itemset ab in Fig. 1a , which have support of 6, 3 and 2 respectively, and are mapped to the same generalized item (a, b) in Fig. 2c . Observe that (a, b) has a support of 7 that is greater than the support of both a and b.
Privacy constraints
The integration of privacy constraints is central to our framework because they allow for the explicit definition of which itemsets are potentially linkable and require protection. In what follows, we formally define the notion of privacy constraints and their satisfiability.
Definition 2 (Privacy Constraint Set).
A privacy constraint p is a non-empty set of items in I that are specified as potentially linkable. The set of all privacy constraints formulates a privacy constraint set P.
Definition 3 (Privacy Constraint Satisfiability).
Given a parameter k, a privacy constraint p = {i 1 , . . . , i r } ∈ P is satisfied when the corresponding itemset r m=1 (i m ) is: (1) supported by at least k transactions inD, or (2) not supported inD and each of its proper subsets is either supported by at least k transactions inD or not supported inD. P is satisfied when every p ∈ P is satisfied. 
Satisfying a privacy constraint p prevents identity disclosure because the number of transactions that can be linked to an individual using any subset of items in p is either at least k, or zero, as shown in Theorem 1.
Theorem 1 (Monotonicity). For a given k, the satisfaction of a privacy constraint p inD implies that each privacy constraint p j ⊂ p is satisfied inD.
Proof Assume that a privacy constraint p j ⊂ p is not satisfied inD for this value of k. Then, according to Definition 3, the satisfaction of p implies that the itemset I = ∀i m ∈ p (i m ) is supported by either at least k or 0 transactions inD. Now, consider an itemset J = ∀i m ∈ p j (i m ), which is derived by applying on each item in p j . Since J ⊂ I , we have
sup(J,D) > sup(I,D) when sup(I,D)
≥ k due to the monotonicity principle [5] . When sup(I,D) = 0, p j is satisfied by Definition 3. In either case, p j is satisfied inD for the given k, which contradicts the assumption and proves that the theorem holds true.
Our privacy constraint specification model offers two benefits. First, it allows data owners to specify a range of different privacy requirements. For instance, it can be applied to protect specific itemsets of various sizes or to provide the same privacy guarantees as k m -anonymity (by formulating a privacy constraint set that consists of all itemsets of size m) and k-anonymity (by formulating a prvacy constraint set that constrains all items). Second, our model allows protecting any set of itemsets without enforcing any additional itemsets to be unnecessarily protected. This is important because unnecessarily protecting itemsets may significantly increase the amount of information loss incurred to anonymize data.
Utility constraints
Privacy protection is offered at the expense of data utility [32, 62] , and so it is important to ensure that anonymized data is not overly distorted. Existing approaches attempt to do so by minimizing the amount of information loss incurred when anonymizing transactions [21, 63] , but do not guarantee furnishing a useful result for intended applications. By contrast, our methodology offers such guarantees through the introduction of utility constraints. Before formally defining such constraints, we make the following important observations related to data usefulness.
Observation 1
Mapping a set of items in the original dataset D to the same generalized item in the anonymized datasetD introduces distortion because these items become indistinguishable inD. When there is no control of how specific items are generalized,D may not be practically useful.
Observation 2
Suppressing an item in D introduces distortion because this item is not contained inD and the amount of distortion increases with the number of suppressions.
Based on these observations, we introduce a utility constraint set U to limit the amount of generalization items are allowed to receive based on application requirements, and bound the number of items that can be suppressed using a threshold s. Definitions 4 and 5 illustrate the concept of a utility constraint set and its satisfiability respectively. Definition 4 (Utility Constraint Set). A utility constraint set U is a partition of I that specifies the set of allowable mappings of the items from I to those ofĨ through . Each element of U is called a utility constraint.
Definition 5 (Utility Constraint Set Satisfiability).
Given sets I,Ĩ, a utility constraint set U, and a parameter s, U is satisfied if and only if (1) for each non-emptyĩ m ∈Ĩ, ∃u ∈ U such that all items in D that are mapped toĩ m are also contained in u, and (2) the fraction of items in I contained in the set of suppressed items S is at most s%.
The first condition limits the maximum amount of generalization each item is allowed to receive in a set-based anonymizationĨ, while the second condition ensures that the number of suppressed items is controlled by a threshold specified by a data owner. When both of these conditions hold, U is satisfied, andĨ corresponds to a dataset that can be meaningfully analyzed. Example 2 illustrates the above definitions.
Example 2 Consider the setĨ, the utility constraint set U illustrated in Fig. 5 , and let s = 12.5%. Observe that all items that are mapped to the generalized itemsĩ 1 andĩ 2 are contained in the utility constraints u 1 and u 2 , respectively, and all items that are mapped to any of the generalized itemsĩ 4 ,ĩ 5 andĩ 6 are also contained in u 4 . Furthermore, the percent of suppressed items is 12.5% because I consists of 8 items (see Fig. 4 ), and only d is suppressed. Thus, both the conditions (1) and (2) of Definition 5 hold and U is satisfied.
We also observe that the number of the supporting transactions of a generalized item in the anonymized datasetD is equal to the number of transactions supporting at least one of the items in the original dataset D that are mapped to this generalized item. This is because a transaction that supports an item in D will also support the generalized item this item is mapped to inD. Based on this observation, we provide the following corollary that highlights the importance of anonymizing data while satisfying utility constraints. 
Corollary 2 Given a utility constraint set
where l(Dĩ Thus, the number of transactions of D supporting any item contained in a utility constraint u ∈ U can be accurately computed from the anonymized datasetD, when U is satisfied and all items in u have been generalized. This is crucial in many data analysis tasks (e.g., in generalized association rule mining [58] ) where the support of itemsets corresponding to aggregate concepts (i.e., itemsets with a more general meaning than the items they are comprised of) needs to be determined, as illustrated below.
Example 3 Consider that the dataset of Fig. 1a has to be anonymized to support a study in which the number of patients diagnosed with diabetes needs to be accurately computed. Assume also that diagnosis codes a and b correspond to two different forms of diabetes, diabetes type-I and diabetes type-II, respectively. Observe that the number of patients suffering from either form (i.e., transactions having a, b or ab) in the dataset of Fig. 1a is the same as in the anonymization of this dataset shown in Fig. 2c , because this anonymization satisfies the utility constraints of Fig. 1c and both a and b in u 1 = {a, b} have been generalized. Note that the anonymization of Fig. 2c cannot be used to determine the number of patients diagnosed with d, since the latter item has been suppressed.
Information loss
There may be many anonymizations that satisfy the privacy and utility constraint sets, but they may not be equally useful. Since discovering the one that least harms data utility is important, we propose a measure to capture data utility based on information loss.
Definition 6 (Utility Loss for a Generalized Item). The Utility Loss (UL) for a generalized itemĩ m is defined as
where |ĩ m | denotes the number of items from I mapped toĩ m using , w :Ĩ → [0, 1] is a function assigning a weight toĩ m , and M and N denote the size of I and D, respectively.
UL measures the amount of information loss caused by generalizing a set of items as a product of three terms. The first term penalizes a generalized item based on the number of items from I mapped to it. This is because a generalized item can be interpreted as any of the 2 |ĩ m | − 1 non-empty subsets of the set of items mapped to it [21] and there are 2 M − 1 possible non-empty subsets that can be formed using items from I. The second term is a weight specified by data owners to quantify the harm to data utility caused by a generalized item, according to the items mapped to it. For normalization purposes, weights need to be between 0 and 1, where larger weights are assigned to generalized items comprised of items that are more semantically distant, since such generalized items are more harmful to data utility [63] . The semantic distance of items can be computed in many ways (e.g., based on the height of a hierarchy [54] , the number of leaves of the closest common ascendant of these items in a hierarchy [71] , with the aid of ontologies [67] , or by expert knowledge). The third term is the support of a generalized item in the anonymized dataset, normalized by the number of transactions. Items that appear often in the anonymized dataset are penalized more, since they introduce more distortion to the data. Example 4 illustrates how UL can be computed.
Example 4 Consider the dataset of Fig. 1a and the anonymized version of it shown in Fig. 2c.  Items a and b are generalized to (a, b) , which is assigned a weight of 0.375 specified by the data owner, and has a support of 7 in Fig. 2c . The UL for (a, b) is computed as The above definition captures data utility loss caused by both generalization and suppression. Specifically, for suppression, similar to [72] , we allow data owners to assign a penalty to each suppressed item, according to the perceived importance of retaining this item in the anonymized result. For instance, each suppressed item could receive a penalty equal to its support based on the fact that this defines the number of transactions from which it is eliminated.
Problem statement
The problem we consider in this paper is formally defined below.
Problem. Given a transactional dataset D, a privacy constraint set P, a utility constraint set U, and parameters k, s, construct an anonymized versionD of D using the set-based anonymization model such that (1) P and U are both satisfied and (2) the amount of utility loss UL(D) is minimal.
A solution to this problem ensures that anonymized data satisfies both of the specified privacy and utility constraint sets, while incurring the smallest possible amount of information loss. However, tackling this problem is challenging, because it is NP-hard, as we show in Theorem 2. Proof The proof is by reduction to the NP-hard optimal cohesion problem [72] . Solving the latter problem for k = 2, P that contains any 2-itemset of I and Y (i j ) = 1 requires applying suppression to constructD from D while minimizing ∀i j ∈D Y (i j ). To map an instance of our problem to an instance of the optimal cohesion problem, it suffices to select U = {u 1 , . . . , u M } such that u j = {i j } (no generalization allowed) and set s to 100% (any number of items can be suppressed). Then,D is a solution to our problem if and only if it is an optimal cohesion of D.
Theorem 2 Given a dataset
Furthermore, constructing a datasetD that satisfies both P and U is not feasible for arbitrarily selected constraints, as shown in Example 5.
Example 5 Consider anonymizing the dataset of Fig. 1a using k = 5 and s = 0%. Also, assume that P contains a single privacy constraint {d} and U a single utility constraint {d}.
Observe that satisfying both P and U using the set-based anonymization model is not feasible because d has to be released intact (i.e., it cannot be suppressed or further generalized while still satisfying U). Releasing d intact, however, does not satisfy P, since the support of d in the data of Fig. 1a is less than 5.
Anonymization algorithm
Since the problem we study is NP-hard, we propose COAT (COnstraint-based Anonymization of Transactions), an effective heuristic. Given D, P, U, k and s, COAT selects a privacy constraint p ∈ P that requires protection and is supported by the largest number of transactions, and applies item generalizations that are specified by U and incur the smallest amount of information loss to satisfy p. When p cannot be satisfied by generalization, COAT suppresses the minimum number of items in p to satisfy it. The process is repeated for all privacy constraints until P is satisfied.
Algorithm 1 COAT(D, P, U , k, s)
input: Dataset D, privacy constraint set P, utility constraint set U , parameters k and s output: Anonymized datasetD 1.D ← D 2. while (P is not satisfied) 3.
find p corresponding to I s.t. I ← arg max ,D) , r ) r min() returns the r -th minimum element
while ( p is not satisfied) 16 .
Pseudocode for COAT is provided in Algorithm 1. Since the anonymized datasetD is produced by transforming items in transactions of the original dataset D, in step 1, we initializẽ D to D. Steps 2 to 17 present the main iteration of COAT, which aims to satisfy the privacy constraint set P (step 2). In step 3, COAT selects the privacy constraint p that is not satisfied and corresponds to an itemset I with maximum support inD. This is the heuristic strategy that incurred the smallest amount of distortion of D out of several strategies we empirically tested. Its performance is attributed to the fact that the minimum number of transactions iñ D have to be distorted to augment the support of I to at least k. In step 4, we initialize r , a counter variable whose role will be explained later, to 1.
Next, in step 5, we check whether p is unsatisfied inD and the number of utility constraints with items in p, measured using a function C, is smaller than |I | (this implies that I contains at least one item that can be generalized according to the utility constraints). While both of these conditions hold true, COAT performs steps 6 to 13. In step 6, we use a function r min() to select the item i m from p with the r th minimum support inD to be generalized. Selecting i m this way attempts to minimize the number of generalizations required to satisfy p, as items with "low" support need to be generalized to meet the specified k. Subsequently, we identify the utility constraint u l from U for which i m ∈ u l , to retrieve the items that are allowed to be generalized with i m (step 7). If at least one item apart from i m is contained in u l (step 8), then there is at least one possible generalization for the item i m , and we select the one that minimizes information loss (step 9) as illustrated in Algorithm 2. Otherwise, if i m is supported by less than k transactions inD, we suppress i m through the Suppress function, shown in Algorithm 3 (steps 10-11). Note that suppressing i m is necessary, because applying generalization to increase the support of i m to k would result in violating u l . In the case that none of the conditions in steps 8 and 10 hold, we check whether the size of item i m equals that of u l (steps 12-13). In this case, i m cannot be further generalized in a way that satisfies u l , and thus we advance r . If the execution remains in the loop of step 4, this will force the next item with minimum support inD to be selected as i m . Note that the condition in step 12 will be true when either of the conditions in steps 8 and 10 fail, because an item (or generalized item) that cannot be generalized according to its associated utility constraint and has a support of at least k will have a size that is equal to that of its associated utility constraint.
Steps 14-17 aim to satisfy p by suppressing the minimum number of items inD required to satisfy this constraint. When p is not satisfied and there are |I | utility constraints each having at least one of its items in p (step 15), we apply suppression, because no item of I can be generalized according to the utility constraints. More specifically, we iteratively suppress items in I , starting with the one having the minimum support, until p is met (steps [15] [16] [17] . Lastly,D is released (step 18).
Algorithm 2 Generalize(i m , u l , P)
input: Item i m , utility constraint u l , privacy constraint set P output: None 1. i s ← arg min
Update transactions ofD based onĩ Algorithms 2 and 3 indicate how COAT performs generalization and suppression, respectively. Each of these operations involves updating the privacy and utility constraint sets P and U, as well as selected transactions ofD.
Specifically, Generalize (Algorithm 2) operates as follows. In step 1, it identifies the item i s that can be generalized together with i m in a way that incurs the least possible information loss according to the UL measure.
Step 2 performs the mapping of the two items to a common generalized itemĩ. Following that, steps 3 − 5 update the privacy and the utility constraints to reflect this generalization. Finally, the transactions ofD that supported any of i m , i s are updated to support the generalized itemĩ instead.
Algorithm 3 Suppress(i m , u l , P, s)
input: Item i m , utility constraint u l , privacy constraint set P, parameter s output:
Remove i m from all transactions ofD 5. if more than s% of items are suppressed 6.
Error: U is violated Suppress (Algorithm 3) involves removing an item i m from the privacy and utility constraint sets (steps 1-3), and the transactions that support it inD (step 4). Finally, it checks whether the imposed suppression threshold s has been surpassed (step 5). This occurs when utility constraints are overly restrictive (e.g., they require all items to remain intact in the anonymized dataset) and a "low" suppression threshold is used. In this case, data owners are notified that the utility constraint set U has been violated and the anonymization process terminates (step 6).
To illustrate how COAT works, we provide the following example.
Example 6
We apply COAT on the dataset D of Fig. 1a , using the constraints of Fig. 1b and c, k = 5, and s = 15%. P contains p 1 and p 2 whose itemsets are equally supported in D and thus COAT arbitrarily considers p 1 = {a, b, c}. This constraint is not satisfied because its support is less than k. Moreover, there are 2 utility constraints, namely u 1 and u 2 , with items in p 1 , and the size of p 1 is 3. Thus, COAT selects b, because it has the minimum support among a, b and c, and retrieves u 1 , the utility constraint that contains b. Then, the latter item is considered for generalization, since u 1 contains additional items. Item b can be generalized with either a or c, as specified by u 1 , but is generalized with a, since (a, b) incurs the minimum information loss. After that, COAT checks whether p 1 has been satisfied, or whether there are two or more utility constraints with items in (a, b) c. Since generalizing a to (a, b) increases the support of (a, b)c to 7, p 1 is now satisfied and COAT proceeds to the next iteration. Notice that otherwise, the algorithm would need to iteratively suppress items in p 1 because there are 2 utility constraints with items in p 1 (i.e., u 1 and u 2 ), and the size of p 1 = {(a, b), c} is 2. Subsequently, COAT considers p 2 = {d, e, f, g, h}. Item d is minimally supported among the items of p 2 , thus it is considered for generalization. However, d cannot be generalized due to u 3 , and it is suppressed, since its support is below k. Note that otherwise, the counter variable r would be increased to 2, because u 3 contains only d. This ensures that another item of p 2 would be selected, if p 2 was not satisfied. After suppressing d, p 2 is still not satisfied. Since in p 2 , both g, h have minimum support, g is arbitrarily selected for generalization and its utility constraint u 4 is retrieved. Then, g is generalized with h because the latter is contained in u 4 and (g, h) incurs the minimum information loss. This satisfies p 2 and P is now satisfied. U is also satisfied as shown in Example 2.
Cost Analysis To estimate the efficiency of COAT, we first derive the worst-case runtime complexity of the functions Generalize and Suppress. The former examines all items in u l that can be generalized with i m and updates P, u l , andD, hence it requires O (|u l | + |P| × |p| + N ) time, where | p| is the size of the privacy constraint COAT attempts to protect in the current iteration and |P| the number of specified privacy constraints. Assuming that |u l | has its maximum value M, the cost of Generalize is approximated by O (M + |P| × |p| + N ). Similarly, it can be seen that Suppression is performed in O (|P| × |p| + N ). Furthermore, COAT deals with items or 2-itemsets, sinceD is updated with the generalized items when Generalize is executed, hence the overhead of the computation of the support of an itemset is negligible. 2 Thus, the cost of protecting p is O (M × (M + |P| × |p| + N )), when all items of p are contained in a utility constraint of size M. This gives a total runtime cost of O (|P| × M × (M + |P| × |p| + N )) for COAT. Note that although |P| is exponential in the domain size in the worst-case in which each itemset is potentially linkable, it is expected to be much smaller in practice because attackers are unlikely to possess knowledge about all possible itemsets [63, 72] . Thus, COAT is fairly efficient for realistic inputs, outperforming the algorithm of [63] , whose complexity is also exponential in the domain size and parameter m, as experimentally shown in Sect. 6.5.
Specifying privacy and utility constraints
The notions of privacy and utility constraints, which reflect itemsets deemed as potentially linkable and important for intended data analysis tasks respectively, are central to our anonymization approach. Our constraint specification framework allows data owners to formulate detailed constraints based on their specific privacy and utility requirements, which are given as input to COAT. However, acknowledging that constraint specification may be challenging for data owners who lack domain knowledge, we present simple methods that aim to help such data owners formulate constraints.
Section 5.1 discusses our Privacy constraint set generation (Pgen) algorithm that constructs a privacy constraint set automatically, assuming that attackers can use any part of any transaction to link published data to individuals. Pgen works by searching the original dataset for itemsets with "low" support. Each of these itemsets is treated as potentially linkable and its items are used to formulate a privacy constraint. Although the resultant privacy constraint set corresponds to a stringent privacy policy, adopting this policy is a safe choice when data owners are unable to specify which items are potentially linkable. Section 5.2 provides a recipe to reduce the effort of specifying utility constraints.
Constructing a privacy constraint set
Before presenting Pgen, we capture the largest part of a transaction that can be used in linkage attacks using Definition 8. 
Definition 8 (Maximal Infrequent Itemsets). Given a transactional dataset

Example 7 illustrates the above definition.
Example 7 Consider a dataset comprised of the last three transactions of the dataset of Fig. 1a (associated with the itemsets {a, c, f }, {a, c} and {b, h}, respectively) and that k is set to 2. The lattice of itemsets in this dataset is illustrated in Fig. 6 , in which the support of each supported itemset is shown next to it. As can be seen, the set of maximal infrequent itemsets in this dataset contains only ac f and bh, as each of these itemsets is supported in the dataset and all of its proper supersets have a support of zero. Given a transactional dataset D, and a parameter k, Pgen constructs a privacy constraint set P that contains all the maximal infrequent itemsets in D. As mentioned earlier, the generated P can be given as input to COAT to ensure that anonymized data can prevent linkage attacks based on any part of any transaction in D. The pseudocode of Pgen is provided in Algorithm 4.
Algorithm 4 Pgen(D, k)
input: Dataset D, parameter s output: None 1. P ← sorted transactions of D with respect to their size in decreasing order 2. foreach (T r ∈ P, r = 1, ..., N ) 3.
Remove T r from P 8. return P Pgen starts by creating a privacy constraint set P, which is initialized by the set of transactions of the original dataset D, each of which is treated as a privacy constraint. Clearly, this set may contain redundant itemsets, which would result in unnecessary computational overhead if used as input to COAT. This is because COAT works by satisfying each privacy constraint iteratively. Therefore, Pgen implements a simple pruning strategy that removes redundant privacy constraints from P to reduce its size without affecting the privacy guarantees provided when P is satisfied.
The first step of this strategy is to populate P with the set of transactions of D, sorted in terms of decreasing size. Subsequently, in steps 2-4, transactions (T s ) that are subsets of other transactions (T r ) are identified and removed from P. This is because these transactions cannot correspond to maximal infrequent itemsets, according to Definition 8. Next, steps 6 and 7 ensure that privacy constraints that do not require protection (i.e., itemsets induced by transactions having a support of at least k in D) are not included in P. Finally, P, which contains the set of maximal infrequent itemsets in D, is returned in step 8. This privacy constraint set can be supplied as input to COAT. Notice that the worst-case runtime complexity of Pgen is quadratic in the size of D, as it involves sorting, pairwise comparison, and support computation for transactions of D. To illustrate how Pgen works, we provide Example 8.
Example 8 Consider applying
Pgen on the dataset of Example 7, using k = 2. This results in initializing P with three privacy constraints p 1 = {a, c, f }, p 2 = {a, c} and p 3 = {b, h} (one for each transaction), which are sorted in terms of decreasing size. Subsequently, p 2 is removed from P, because {a, c} is a subset of p 1 = {a, c, f }. Next, Pgen checks the support of p 1 , and so retains it in P as the support of p 1 in this dataset is 1 ∈ (0, 2). In the final iteration, Pgen examines p 3 , and retains it in P for the same reason. Thus, Pgen returns P = {p 1 , p 3 }.
Formulating a utility constraint set
While privacy constraints can be extracted automatically as discussed earlier, this is difficult for utility constraints, because they model application-specific data analysis requirements. Thus, we assume that data owners are able to specify utility constraints to avoid distorting itemsets that need to be used in intended applications.
When interested in generating anonymized data that allow the counts of aggregate concepts to be accurately determined, for example, data users can formulate a utility constraint for each of these concepts (itemsets), as explained in Sect. 3.4. These itemsets may be selected with the help of hierarchies or ontologies, which are specified by domain experts or constructed in an automated fashion [53] . A utility constraint containing the remaining items (i.e., those not contained in the selected itemsets) should also be specified to ensure that the utility constraint set is a partition of I (see Definition 4) .
We emphasize that the way all items are generalized is governed by the utility loss function (see Definition 6), which forces semantically related items to be generalized together. Example 9 illustrates how utility constraints may be specified.
Example 9
Consider that the dataset of Fig. 1a needs to be anonymized to support the study of Example 3 in which the number of patients diagnosed with diabetes (i.e., transactions having a, b, or ab) needs to be accurately computed. To support this study, the hospital can specify a utility constraint {a, b} and include all the remaining diagnosis codes in a second constraint {c, d, e, f, g, h}.
Experimental evaluation
In this section, we compare COAT to Apriori [63] using an extensive evaluation comprised of four series of experiments. In the first series, we compare the amount of information loss the algorithms incur to achieve k m -anonymity. The second and third series of experiments examine whether the algorithms can satisfy detailed privacy and utility requirements without harming data utility, and the last series evaluates their efficiency.
Experimental setup and metrics
We use two real-world transactional datasets, BMS-Web View-1 (BMS1) and BMS-WebView-2 (BMS2), which contain click-stream data from two e-commerce sites. The datasets have been used in evaluating anonymization algorithms for transactional data [21, 63] and also as benchmarks in the 2000 KDD-Cup competition. Table 1 summarizes their characteristics.
Among the proposed anonymization algorithms for transactional data [21, 28, 63, 72] , we chose to compare COAT to Apriori [63] , because: (i) it is applicable to datasets with realistic domain sizes (i.e, domains comprised of more than 50 items), contrary to the other algorithms proposed in [63] , (ii) it does not require a fixed classification of items into potentially linkable and sensitive items, similarly to COAT (and different from [21, 72] ), and (iii) unlike [28] , it adopts an anonymization model in which instances of the same item are mapped to the same generalized item in all transactions, as in the set-based anonymization model. To ensure a fair comparison between COAT and Apriori, we configured the latter with the same hierarchies as in [63] and set the weights w(ĩ m ) used in COAT based on a notion of semantic distance computed according to the aforementioned hierarchies [71] .
Both COAT and Apriori were implemented in C++. All experiments were performed on an Intel 2.8 GHz machine equipped with 4 GB of RAM.
To quantify information loss, we assumed that data recipients are interested in answering aggregate queries, and measured the accuracy of answering workloads of queries on anonymized data produced by the tested algorithms. This is a widely-used approach to characterize information loss [21, 33] and is invariant of the way the tested algorithms work. Consider the COUNT() query Q shown in Fig. 7 . Since data recipients have only access to anonymized dataD, they need to estimate an answer for Q.
This estimation can be performed by computing the probability thatT n , the anonymized version of a transaction T n , satisfies Q. The latter equals the probability that T n supports an item i r , r = 1, . . . , q that is mapped toĩ m inT n , assuming thatĩ m is interpreted as any possible subset of the items mapped to it with equal probability, and that there are no correlations among generalized items [21, 33] . An approximate answer e(Q) of Q is then derived by summing the corresponding probabilities across all transactionsT n ofD. To illustrate how an approximate answer can be computed we provide the following example.
Example 10 Consider that a data recipient wants to answer a query Q 1 asking for the number of patients associated with a using the anonymized data of Fig. 2c. Since a is generalized to  (a, b) , the data recipient computes the probability an anonymized transaction that supports (a, b) supported a prior to anonymization. The latter probability equals 2 3 , assuming that a transaction that supports (a, b) could support a or b or ab equally likely before anonymization. Then, an approximate answer to Q 1 is computed as To measure the accuracy of estimating Q, we use the Relative Error (RE) measure computed as R E(Q) = |a(Q) − e(Q)|/a(Q), where a(Q) is the actual answer for Q, which is obtained when this query is applied to original data D. For instance, the Relative Error for Q 1 is |6 − 4.67|/6 ≈ 0.22 because the answer for this query when applied to the original data of Fig. 1a is 6 . Given a workload of queries, the Average Relative Error (AvgRE) for all queries, reflects how well anonymized data supports query answering [33, 70] . To measure AvgRE, we constructed workloads comprised of 1,000 COUNT() queries similar to Q. The items participating in these queries were selected randomly from the generalized items.
Achieving k m -anonymity
In this section, we empirically confirm that COAT not only satisfies k m -anonymity, but does so while incurring an amount of information loss that is on average 7.3 times, and up to 9 times, smaller than that incurred by Apriori. Specifically, we ran COAT by including all m-itemsets in the privacy constraint set P, considering a utility constraint set U that contains all items (effectively allowing all possible generalizations), and setting s = 0.5%. Both algorithms used the same k and m values. The results with respect to AvgRE and UL measures are summarized in Sects. 6.2.1 and 6.2.2 respectively. In these experiments COAT did not suppress any items. Figure 8a and b report AvgRE scores for BMS1, where the number of items q included in a query was 1 and 3 respectively, m was set to 2, and k was selected over the range [2, 50] . As expected, increasing k induced more information loss due to the utility/privacy tradeoff. Increasing q had a similar effect because accurately answering queries involving many items is more difficult. COAT outperformed Apriori in both cases, achieving up to 9 times better AvgRE scores. This is because, as k increases, the recoding model of Apriori forces an increasingly large number of items to be generalized together, while the model in COAT generalizes no more items than required to protect an itemset. Similar results were achieved for BMS2 (omitted for brevity). We also executed COAT and Apriori using k = 5 and varied m between 1 and 3. The AvgRE scores for BMS1 are shown in Fig. 9a . Apriori incurred 7 times more information loss than COAT to anonymize BMS1 when m = 3. This is because the number of items that Apriori forces to be generalized together to protect m-itemsets increases substantially as m grows. The impact of this generalization strategy on data utility was even more evident in the case of BMS2, as shown in Fig. 9b . 
Capturing data utility using AvgRE
Capturing data utility using UL
We compared the two algorithms with respect to the proposed UL measure, because, contrary to the AvgRE measure, UL captures the amount of information loss irrespective of the application anonymized data is intended for. Fig. 10a shows the result of running these algorithms on BMS2 using m = 2 and k values between 2 and 50. Observe that Apriori was fairly insensitive to k up to 25. In fact, Apriori over-generalized itemsets by increasing their support to much larger values than k due to its recoding strategy. On the other hand, COAT achieved a much better result for all tested k values due to the fine-grained generalization model it employs. We also examined how the algorithms fared with respect to UL when m varies between 1 and 3, and k = 5. Observe that Apriori incurred substantially more information loss than COAT for all tested m values. This again suggests that the generalization scheme of Apriori distorts data much more than our set-based anonymization strategy. Similar results were obtained for BMS1 (omitted for brevity). We do not report additional results with respect to UL because COAT is designed to optimize the UL measure and thus outperformed Apriori in all tested cases.
Privacy constraints vs. data utility
In this section, we experimentally confirm that our approach can generate anonymizations with a high level of data utility through the specification of detailed privacy constraints by data owners. The impact of constraints generated by Pgen on data utility will be examined in Sect. 7. We constructed two types of privacy policies to simulate different privacy requirements. In the first type, the itemsets that require protection are all of the same size and comprised of certain items from I. In the second type, such itemsets differ in size. The utility constraint set U supplied to COAT was set as in Sect. 6.2. 
Protecting itemsets comprised of certain items
We considered 5 privacy policies of the first type: PP1,…, PP5. Each of these policies assume that all 2-itemsets containing a certain percent of randomly selected items require protection with k = 5. The mappings between privacy policies and the percent of such items are illustrated in Table 2 . These policies are taken into account by COAT, but not by Apriori, which needs to protect all 2-itemsets to satisfy them. We first studied how privacy policies affect data utility, as captured by AvgRE. Figure 11a and b illustrate the results for q = 1 and q = 3 respectively. As expected, because COAT avoids unnecessarily protecting itemsets that are not specified by these policies, it distorted data significantly less than Apriori. This is supported by the AvgRE scores for COAT, which were significantly better than Apriori. Furthermore, as policies become more strict (i.e., require protecting itemsets induced by a larger subset of items from I), the AvgRE scores for COAT decreased slightly due to the utility/privacy traded-off. Nevertheless, these scores remain substantially better than that of Apriori in all cases. We repeated the same experiments for BMS2, and obtained similar results shown in Fig. 11c and d respectively. 
Protecting itemsets of varying size
We simulated 4 privacy policies of the second type: PP6, . . . , PP9. In each of these policies, P consisted of itemsets with size 1-4, as shown in Table 3 , and k = 5. To account for these policies, Apriori had to protect all possible 4-itemsets, and thus it was configured with m = 4. The AvgRE scores for BMS1 and BMS2, and a workload comprised of queries with q = 2, are depicted in Fig. 12a and b respectively. Notice that COAT achieved better AvgRE scores in both datasets, permitting answers to queries up to 40 times more accurately than Apriori. This is because COAT applies generalization to each privacy constraint separately, thereby applying the minimum level of generalization required to satisfy the specified constraint.
Utility constraints vs. data utility
The experiments reported in this section examine the effect of utility constraints on data utility. We assumed 4 utility policies: UP1, . . . , UP4. Each utility policy contains groups of a certain number of semantically close items (i.e., sibling items in the hierarchy). The mappings between utility policies and the size of these groups are illustrated in Table 4 . Items in each group are allowed to be generalized together. Note that utility policies that allow a small number of items to be generalized together are, in general, difficult to be satisfied without suppression when privacy constraints are stringent due to the utility/privacy trade-off. Therefore, we configured COAT with a small suppression threshold s of 0.5%. We assumed that all items are potentially linkable and constructed two different sets of privacy constraints: P 1 that contains all 2-itemsets and P 2 that contains all 3-itemsets.
We first report the result for the privacy constraint set P 1 . AvgRE scores for a workload of queries that retrieve items and 3-itemsets, are shown in Fig. 13a and b respectively, for BMS1. As can be seen from these figures, the performance of Apriori remained constant, since this algorithm does not generalize items based on the utility policies, and COAT significantly outperformed Apriori for all utility policies. Also, the AvgRE scores for COAT were not substantially affected by the utility policies, as COAT applied a much lower level of generalization than that specified by the utility policies. Similar trends were observed for BMS2 (omitted for brevity). Subsequently, we considered the privacy constraint set P 2 . Figure 14a illustrates the AvgRE scores for a workloads of queries that retrieves items, for BMS1. As can be seen, COAT incurred a smaller amount of information loss for more stringent utility policies. Specifically, the AvgRE score for COAT in the case of UP1 was 6.5 times smaller than when this algorithm was applied with UP4. This is because the amount of information loss required to satisfy P 2 was larger than the one incurred in the case of P 1 and bounded by the utility policies. Nevertheless, COAT performed significantly better than Apriori for all utility policies, achieving AvgRE scores that are at least 2.3 times smaller than those of Apriori. Similar results were obtained for BMS1 and a workload of query that retrieves 3-itemsets (shown in Fig. 14b ) and for BMS2 (omitted for brevity).
Furthermore, the number of suppressed items was very small (0.01% in the case of P 1 and 0.3% in the case of P 2 ) and occurred only in the case of UP1. This illustrates the effectiveness of COAT, which suppresses the minimum number of items required, and only when utility constraints cannot be otherwise met. We also note that COAT was able to satisfy the imposed utility policies in all cases, whereas Apriori was unable to meet any of them.
Efficiency of computation
We compared COAT and Apriori in terms of efficiency. We first examined the scalability of these algorithms with respect to the size of the dataset, by applying them on a dataset constructed by randomly selecting transactions of BMS1. COAT was configured by setting P and U as in Sect. 6.2, m = 2 and k = 5. Apriori was run with the same k and m values. Figure 15a reports run-time as cardinality varies from 1 to 50 K transactions. COAT scales better than Apriori with the size of the dataset; up to 2.5 times faster. This is because COAT prunes the space by discarding protected itemsets as cardinality increases, whereas Apriori considers all m-itemsets as well as their possible generalizations. Last, we evaluated the impact of k on the run-time of COAT and Apriori on BMS1. We used values of k between 2 and 50, and set up all other parameters as in the previous experiment. As can be seen in Fig. 15b , COAT is slightly less efficient than Apriori. This is due to the fact that COAT generalizes one item at a time, exploiting the flexibility of the set-based anonymization model. By comparison, Apriori generalizes entire subtrees of items and thus reaches the specified k faster. Nevertheless, the computation cost of COAT was less than half a minute, remaining sub-linear for all tested values of parameter k.
Real application case study: publishing diagnosis codes
In this section, we examine whether COAT can produce anonymized data that permits accurate analysis in a real-world scenario involving detailed, application-specific utility requirements. In this context, a transactional dataset (referred to as EMR) derived from the electronic medical record system of the Vanderbilt University Medical Center [60] needs to be published to enable certain biomedical studies. Each transaction of EMR corresponds to a distinct patient, and contains their diagnosis codes in the form of ICD-9 codes. 3 Table 5 summarizes the characteristics of the EMR dataset.
The studies that anonymized data needs to support focus on 20 different disorders as defined by the medical community [40] , each of which is modeled as a set of ICD-9 codes. For instance, pancreatic cancer is represented as a set of 7 ICD-9 codes, which correspond to different forms of pancreatic cancer and indicate that a patient suffers from this disorder. To support these studies, the number of patients suffering from each of these disorders needs to be accurately computed. At the same time, the linkage of transactions to patients' identities based on ICD-9 codes must be prevented, because ICD-9 codes contained in EMR can be found in other sources, such as in publicly available hospital discharge summaries. To achieve privacy, we used our Pgen algorithm to construct a privacy constraint set, effectively assuming that any part of a transaction in the EMR dataset can be used to link published data to patients. This models a stringent privacy policy that may be adopted by data owners who cannot determine exactly which combinations of diagnosis codes an attacker may use, such as researchers with little expertise in privacy or others who do not know the specific recipients of data, as is the case when data is deposited into repositories for research purposes [39] . In addition, due to the trade-off between data utility and privacy [54, 63] , the constructed privacy constraint set is expected to be difficult to satisfy without incurring "much" information loss. Obviously, data owners are able to specify different privacy constraints based on their expectations about attackers' knowledge and use them as input to COAT. To achieve utility, we formulated a utility constraint set comprised of 20 constraints, one for each disorder (e.g., we specified a utility constraint that contains the 7 ICD-9 codes corresponding to pancreatic cancer). Furthermore, we configured COAT by setting the weights w(ĩ m ) based on a notion of semantic similarity [71] computed according to the standard hierarchy for ICD-9 codes, 4 and limited the maximum allowable fraction of suppressed items by setting s to 0.5%. Apriori was also applied to anonymize EMR, although it provides no guarantees that utility constraints are satisfied.
We evaluated the utility of anonymizations produced by both COAT and Apriori in two ways. First, we examined whether the produced anonymizations satisfied the specified utility constraint set. In fact, anonymizations constructed by COAT satisfy the latter set for all tested k values (namely 2, 5, 10, 25 and 50). Thus, COAT managed to generate practically useful anonymizations that allow the number of patients diagnosed with any of the 20 disorders used in the intended studies [40] to be accurately computed (see Corollary 2) . On the other hand, the anonymizations constructed by the Apriori algorithm did not satisfy the specified utility constraint set for any of the tested k values. Therefore, we did not evaluate the data utility of anonymizations produced by Apriori using other criteria.
In addition to satisfying the specified utility constraints, it is also important to generate anonymized data with "low" information loss that can support general data analysis tasks. Therefore, we investigated whether our method can generate anonymizations that are useful in aggregate query answering. To capture the amount of information loss, we used the AvgRE measure, discussed in Sect. 6.1. AvgRE was computed using two different workloads referred to as W1 and W2 respectively. W1 is comprised of COUNT() queries that retrieve combinations of ICD-9 codes supported by at least 10% of the transactions of EMR. These combinations correspond to frequently co-occurring disorders (e.g., diabetes and hypertension) that are important in the context of biomedical data analysis, and are different from the 20 disorders contained in the utility constraint set. W2 is similar to the workload considered in Sect. 6.1. It is comprised of 1,000 COUNT() queries similar to the query shown in Fig. 7 , each of which is comprised of 2 ICD-9 codes randomly selected among generalized items. This workload models a scenario involving anonymized data that is queried by users with various data analysis requirements.
Figure16a reports the AvgRE scores for EMR, where k was selected over the range [2, 50] , and W1 was used. As can be seen, the AvgRE scores indicate that anonymized data permits queries that are common in biomedical data analysis tasks to be answered fairly accurately, even when a strict privacy policy is adopted. The corresponding result for W2 is reported in Fig. 16b . As can be seen, the AvgRE scores are relatively low when k is 5 or lower, as it is commonly the case when publishing biomedical data [15] , but increase as k gets larger. This is because anonymizing the items retrieved by queries in W1 requires incurring more information loss, since the majority of these items are not contained in the 20 disorders anonymized data needs to support and have a small support.
In summary, our case study confirms the effectiveness of the proposed anonymization approach when there are specific utility requirements. This is because it allows the EMR dataset to be published in a way that prevents linkage attacks with respect to any portion of any transaction of this dataset, helps biomedical studies focusing on specific disorders, and allows accurate data analysis.
Conclusions and future work
Existing approaches for anonymizing transactional data often produce excessively distorted data that is of limited utility in intended applications because they do not incorporate detailed privacy requirements, are agnostic with respect to data utility requirements, and search only a small fraction of the space of possible anonymizations. In response, we developed a novel approach that overcomes these limitations by exploiting contextual information in the form or fine-grained privacy and utility requirements that are specified as constraints. We showed that the problem of producing anonymizations under constraints is NP-hard and developed COAT (COnstraint-based Anonymization of Transactions), an algorithm that transforms data using a flexible anonymization model to satisfy the specified constraints with low information loss. We also demonstrated the effectiveness of our approach using extensive experiments on benchmark datasets and a real application case study on patients' data. Our results verify that COAT is able to satisfy a wide range of privacy and utility requirements with less information loss than the state-of-the-art method, and is able to anonymize data in a way that prevents identity disclosure and retains data utility for intended applications.
We believe that this work represents a first, important step toward exploiting privacy and utility requirements to effectively anonymize transactional data in real-world scenarios. However, it also opens up several directions for future investigation. First, we intend to develop approximation algorithms to tackle the problem of generating anonymizations that satisfy the specified constraints and are bounded from the optimal solution in terms of information loss. Second, we aim at extending our framework to deal with the inference of sensitive information based on the privacy principle proposed in [38] . Third, we are interested in developing transactional data anonymization approaches that provide utility guarantees in the context of specific data mining tasks.
